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Georgia Lawyer Search - Listings for Banks Rafe III
Name: Banks Rafe III
Address: 309 Pirkle Ferry Rd Cumming, GA 30040
Phone Number: 770-887-1209
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Specialties:
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Personal Injury & Property Damage Law
Adoption, Divorce & Family Law
Criminal Trial
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Cases related to this attorney's specialties:
USCA10 Opinion 05-9000.wpd FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit March 9, 2006 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT RONALD F. VAN SCOTEN; CYNTHIA G. VAN SCOTEN, Petitioners - Appellants, No. 05-9000 vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent - Appellee. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT (T.C. No. 24946-96) Terri A. Merriam (and Wendy S. Pearson, Pearson & Merriam, P.C, with her on the briefs), Seattle, Washington, for Petitioners - Appellants. Anthony T. Sheehan (and Bruce R. Ellisen, Tax Division, Department of Justice, and Eileen J. O'Connor, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief), Washington, D.C., for Respondent - Appellee. Before KELLY, HENRY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges. KELLY, Circuit Judge. Taxpayer-Appellants Ronald and Cynthia Van Scoten (collectively, the "Van Scotens") appeal from the Tax Court's decision in Van Scoten v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-275, 2004 WL 2785918 (2004) ("T.C. Memo"), holding them liable for an accuracy-related penalty of $2,872 imposed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("Commissioner") as a result of their negligence in claiming losses from a cattle partnership they were invested in during the 1991 tax year. Our jurisdiction arises under 26 U.S.C. 7482(a)(1), and we affirm. Background The accuracy-related penalty at issue in this case arises from adjustments of partnership items on the Van Scotens' 1991 Federal income tax return. The adjustments are the result of the Van Scotens' investment in a partnership organized and promoted by Walter J. Hoyt III ("Mr. Hoyt"). I. Mr. Hoyt and the Hoyt Organization Mr. Hoyt's father was a nationally recognized breeder of shorthorn cattle, one of the three major breeds of cattle in the United States. In order to expand his business and attract investors, Mr. Hoyt's father, in the late 1960s, began organizing and promoting cattle breeding partnerships. Before and after his father's deat...
HERSHEY FOODS CORP v AGRI, U.S. DC Circuit Court of AppealsHERSHEY FOODS CORP v AGRI United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued April 18, 2002 Decided June 18, 2002 No. 01-5169 Hershey Foods Corporation, Appellant v. Department of Agriculture, Appellee Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (99cv02138) Andrew G. McBride argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Eve J. Klindera. Robert M. Reese entered an appearance. Douglas N. Letter, Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney. Before: Sentelle, Randolph and Garland, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph. Randolph, Circuit Judge: Hershey Foods Corporation ap- peals the dismissal of its complaint seeking to vacate a portion of the Department of Agriculture's regulation estab- lishing pricing classifications of milk used in the manufacture of milk chocolate. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that legislation converted the regulation into a statute, not subject to judicial review under the Administra- tive Procedure Act. Although we disagree with the district court in this respect, we hold that dismissal was proper because Hershey failed to exhaust its administrative reme- dies. I. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 ("AMAA"), empowered the Secretary of Agriculture to regu- late the sale of milk by geographic region. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5). Over the years, the Secretary issued many milk marketing orders, applying to different geographic regions and classifying milk according to the "form in which or the purpose for which it is used." 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(A). By 1998, there were thirty-one milk marketing orders in effect. See Milk in the New England and Other Marketing Areas: Proposed Rule and Opportun...
DORIS DAY ANIMAL v VENEMAN ANN, U.S. DC Circuit Court of AppealsDORIS DAY ANIMAL v VENEMAN AN 1000 N United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued November 4, 2002 Decided January 14, 2003 No. 01-5351 Doris Day Animal League, et al., Appellees v. Ann M. Veneman, in her official capacity as Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, et al., Appellants Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (00cv01057) John S. Koppel, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Michael Jay Singer, Attorney, U. S. Department of Justice. Christine M. Cooper was on the brief for amicus curiae American Kennel Club, Inc., in support of appellants. Andrew C. Kimbrell, pro hac vice, argued the cause for appellees. Joseph Mendelson III was on the brief. Before: Randolph and Rogers, Circuit Judges, and Williams, Senior Circuit Judge. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph. Randolph, Circuit Judge: Hundreds of thousands of dog breeders throughout the United States raise and sell puppies from their homes. The Animal Welfare Act requires certain animal "dealers" to be licensed and to submit to inspections. The Act, which is administered by the Department of Agricul- ture, exempts "retail pet stores" from these requirements. The Secretary defines "retail pet store" as "any outlet where only the following animals are sold or offered for sale, at retail for use as pets: Dogs, cats, rabbits, guinea pigs, hamsters, gerbils, rats, mice, gophers, chinchilla, domestic ferrets, domestic farm animals, birds, and coldblooded spe- cies." 9 C.F.R. § 1.1. The effect of this regulation is to exempt breeders who sell dogs as pets from their residences. The issue is whether the regulation is valid. Doris Day Animal League, a membership organizat...
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